Disk Encryption Support
To enhance the security of system deployments before manufacturing provisions the Targets, LmP takes the approach detailed here.
During the image creation process in CI, LmP uses LUKS to construct a symmetrically encrypted root file-system. The master key used for data encryption is locked/unlocked via a passphrase.
Upon the initial boot, during initramfs, the passphrase used for accessing the master key is discarded and replaced by a cryptographic key. Since this key is used to protect the master key, it is known as the Key Encryption Key (KEK).
LmP uses LUKS which uses Systemd to register the new KEK. The KEK is an RSA 2048 asymmetric key, with the key pair being generated via either a TPM 2.0 or a PKCS#11 security token. This also ensures the secure storage of the key information.
By enrolling the KEK this way, the system gains the capability of unlocking the volume seamlessly, without requiring any user involvement.
Once the KEK has been enrolled, LmP marks the rootfs volume for disk
re-encryption, mounts it and allows the system to continue with the
boot sequence. This is know in LUKS terminology as online
re-encryption.
As part of the regular boot procedure, a systemd service will initiate the data re-encryption process in the background; this process is non-blocking and allows the rest of the system to continue initializing.
Upon completion of the re-encryption, the service also creates and stores a backup of the LUKS2 header. This backup image is stored in the primary partition and serves as a safeguard, enabling the booting of systems in cases where their disk headers may have been damaged.
Note
If the system is restarted before the non-blocking re-encryption service has finished, the subsequent boot will be blocked in initramfs until the root file system has been fully encrypted.
Prerequisites
To ensure that the disk encryption and decryption processes can be carried out without human intervention, LmP mandates the presence of either PKCS#11 or TPM 2.0 controlled devices on the target hardware.
Devices controlled via PKCS#11 or TPM 2.0 interfaces can therefore be utilized to securely store and provide the Key Encryption Key (KEK).
Storing the KEK is achieved through the use of LUKS2 tokens, making use of either the systemd-pkcs11 or systemd-tpm2 plugins (refer to systemd-cryptenroll for additional details).
Fig. 41 systemd-cryptenroll
In ARM System on Chips (SoCs), a common PKCS#11 scenario is to execute OP-TEE within the TrustZone. In this setup, OP-TEE should be configured to use the eMMC Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) for secure storage with tamper-resistant properties.
In TPM 2.0 devices and as a security enhancement, we require that UEFI boots with secure boot be enabled. This is because the KEK is linked to the Platform Configuration Register 7 (PCR 7), which monitors the secure boot state of the machine.
We demonstrate both of these scenarios using QEMU in the sections below.
Enabling Support for Disk Encryption
The following options require customizations for disk encryption support:
For adding the required initramfs-module-cryptfs module to the initramfs (based on what gets provided by MACHINE_FEATURES, like tpm2 or optee):
DISTRO_FEATURES:append = " luks"
For splitting the /boot content from the ostree deployment in a separated partition (where kernel/initramfs gets stored, unencrypted).
This option is enabled by default on systems booting with UEFI support:
OSTREE_SPLIT_BOOT = "1"
For supporting the copying of content from /usr/lib/ostree-boot (used for boot firmware updates) to /boot, as part of the ostree deployment step (OTA).
This is required for supporting boot firmware updates on devices with encrypted root file systems:
OSTREE_DEPLOY_USR_OSTREE_BOOT = "1"
For supporting /boot being in a separated partition at the final image the selected WKS_FILE needs to support split boot.
UEFI based devices already have such setup by default, but on most ARM/ARM64 devices a custom WKS might be required.
As an example, iMX8-based devices should use sdimage-imx8-spl-split-boot-sota.wks.in instead of the default sdimage-imx8-spl-sota.wks.ini file:
WKS_FILE:sota:mx8mm-nxp-bsp = "sdimage-imx8-spl-split-boot-sota.wks.in"
Note
Along with a custom WKS_FILE for split boot support, also update the target fstab to automatically mount /boot (from the first partition).
This is not required with UEFI-based systems, as systemd is capable of automatically identifying and mounting the ESP partition during boot.
Implementation Details for OP-TEE PKCS#11 Support
A dedicated slot is required to avoid conflicts with the PKCS#11 token slot normally used by aktualizr-lite.
This dedicated slot is currently hardcoded to slot 1, with the label lmp.
During the encryption process the token slot is initialized and a RSA 2048 key is generated, which is later used by systemd-cryptenroll.
Make sure to not erase the token slot or the key during the lifetime of the image. Doing so would cause the system to fail at boot. A recovery key can be created and provided manually if required, but it will not be an unattended boot.
Testing TPM 2.0 Support With Qemu (x86) and swtpm
It is possible to test the disk encryption support with TPM 2.0 with QEMU and swtpm.
Make sure LUKS support is enabled for your x86 target:
$ cat meta-subscriber-overrides/conf/machine/include/lmp-factory-custom.inc
DISTRO_FEATURES:append:intel-corei7-64 = " luks"
Then make sure to enroll the UEFI Secure Boot Certificates to enable secure boot support. This is required as the LUKS2 TPM 2.0 token leverages PCR 7, which tracks the secure boot state.
Now install swtpm on the host machine, and start the swtpm daemon.
This will be consumed by QEMU and act as the hardware TPM.
$ mkdir -p /tmp/mytpm
$ while true; do swtpm socket --tpmstate dir=/tmp/mytpm --ctrl type=unixio,path=/tmp/mytpm/swtpm-sock --tpm2; done;
Run QEMU with the required extra TPM 2.0 related commands:
$ qemu-system-x86_64 -device virtio-net-pci,netdev=net0,mac=52:54:00:12:35:02 \
-netdev user,id=net0,hostfwd=tcp::2222-:22 \
-object rng-random,filename=/dev/urandom,id=rng0 -device virtio-rng-pci,rng=rng0 \
-drive if=none,id=hd,file=lmp-factory-image-intel-corei7-64.wic,format=raw \
-device virtio-scsi-pci,id=scsi -device scsi-hd,drive=hd \
-drive if=pflash,format=qcow2,file=ovmf.secboot.qcow2 -no-reboot \
-nographic -m 1024 -serial mon:stdio -serial null -cpu host -enable-kvm \
-chardev socket,id=chrtpm,path=/tmp/mytpm/swtpm-sock \
-tpmdev emulator,id=tpm0,chardev=chrtpm -device tpm-tis,tpmdev=tpm0
You should see the following during the first boot:
...
Starting version 250.5+
/dev/sda2 not yet encrypted, encrypting with LUKS2
[ 0.699667] e2fsck: otaroot: clean, 15983/934032 files, 447887/933901 blocks
resize2fs 1.46.5 (30-Dec-2021)
Resizing the filesystem on /dev/sda2 to 925709 (4k) blocks.
The filesystem on /dev/sda2 is now 925709 (4k) blocks long.
Key slot 0 created.
Finished, time 00:15.011, 3632 MiB written, speed 240.9 MiB/s
Command successful.
Enrolling LUKS2 keyslot based on tpm2 token
New TPM2 token enrolled as key slot 1.
Wiped slot 0.
[ 44.126792] e2fsck: otaroot: clean, 15983/934032 files, 447887/925709 blocks
...
Verify that LUKS2 is using the TPM 2.0 based systemd token for encryption:
root@intel-corei7-64-unknown:~# cryptsetup luksDump /dev/sda2
LUKS header information
Version: 2
Epoch: 463
Metadata area: 16384 [bytes]
Keyslots area: 16744448 [bytes]
UUID: af0d8a12-5c60-48d1-9f03-a6165906df30
Label: otaroot
Subsystem: (no subsystem)
Flags: (no flags)
Data segments:
0: crypt
offset: 16777216 [bytes]
length: (whole device)
cipher: aes-xts-plain64
sector: 512 [bytes]
Keyslots:
1: luks2
Key: 512 bits
Priority: normal
Cipher: aes-xts-plain64
Cipher key: 512 bits
PBKDF: pbkdf2
Hash: sha512
Iterations: 1000
Salt: d1 2f 37 48 98 37 32 5a f8 3a 45 29 dd 04 03 43
89 d2 ae ed 8e d9 56 2f c1 d0 60 31 12 8e 1d 46
AF stripes: 4000
AF hash: sha512
Area offset:290816 [bytes]
Area length:258048 [bytes]
Digest ID: 0
Tokens:
0: systemd-tpm2
tpm2-pcrs: 7
tpm2-bank: sha256
tpm2-primary-alg: ecc
tpm2-blob: 00 9e 00 20 7f 2c f2 d0 ec 9b 17 a3 7e 48 90 bf
74 1f 43 92 2e d3 45 6d b4 1d 06 6a b8 4c 65 3f
54 64 b6 75 00 10 09 ee 39 3c ce 2a 6f cc b1 1e
f9 e7 50 e2 1b ce 6c 6d 26 1e 2a 39 24 01 e8 39
7b 44 90 62 a2 b9 6b 81 7a 43 9e 76 93 0c 39 d6
76 47 85 67 d8 bc 07 4c 68 b1 43 b8 25 58 ed 97
c7 0f 00 a7 33 43 2d b2 8b e1 94 da ac 80 19 03
1e 06 be 03 7a d5 28 a6 26 cf b5 db f9 63 ee 2a
bb 40 9f b0 b6 08 64 6b 3a 5f b1 31 c0 e9 62 12
17 fc e8 b6 48 94 d0 80 9e f1 5f d3 9a 85 14 0f
00 4e 00 08 00 0b 00 00 00 12 00 20 86 0e d1 f6
e3 49 84 56 16 f1 4e cb cd 56 76 b6 97 0e d2 48
4b 96 c9 af ee 27 a4 f2 de ce 48 84 00 10 00 20
34 85 f5 a4 b1 a4 ca 83 c7 ff ab aa 55 46 a7 4d
89 8b 55 4a 82 36 4a 1d 77 36 3e b7 50 8c 81 4f
tpm2-policy-hash:
86 0e d1 f6 e3 49 84 56 16 f1 4e cb cd 56 76 b6
97 0e d2 48 4b 96 c9 af ee 27 a4 f2 de ce 48 84
Keyslot: 1
Digests:
0: pbkdf2
Hash: sha256
Iterations: 312076
Salt: 6c 91 b1 65 23 2f 70 0d 36 ba 42 cc 3e 97 33 e1
73 48 b4 84 d7 32 7d 1b 81 a5 ed fd 7c 5e 06 4c
Digest: 5c 30 5b f3 59 db fe 6a 71 c4 9a a0 2d 22 cf 6b
18 e7 cc 8d 6a 44 c9 67 97 f8 34 80 96 69 53 7b
Note
As long as the TPM 2.0 emulation storage is not deleted, you will be able to reboot your QEMU image since the key will persist.
Implementation Details for OP-TEE PKCS#11 Support
To prevent conflicts with the PKCS#11 token slot utilized by
aktualizr-lite, a dedicated slot is necessary.
LmP will set this dedicated slot as slot 1 with the label lmp.
Before initiating the re-encryption process, the slot is initialized, and a new RSA 2048 key is generated. This key never leaves the PKCS#11 domain.
It is important to emphasize that only the encrypted master key is stored in the LUKS JSON token header area.
Please ensure that you DO NOT erase the PKCS#11 token slot or its key throughout the lifespan of your product. Failure to follow this precaution will result in the system’s inability to boot.
In the event of such a scenario, a recovery key can be created and provided manually, but it won’t support an unattended boot process.
Testing PKCS#11 Support With Qemu (arm64)
Make sure LUKS support is enabled for your qemuarm64-secureboot target:
$ cat meta-subscriber-overrides/conf/machine/include/lmp-factory-custom.inc
DISTRO_FEATURES:append:qemuarm64-secureboot = " luks"
When running QEMU, please be cautious not to exceed 2GB of memory usage, as attempting to use more than 2GB of memory may prevent the OP-TEE emulation from successfully booting. So, it’s advisable to stay within this memory limit.
$ qemu-system-aarch64 -m 2048 -cpu cortex-a57 -no-acpi -bios flash.bin \
-device virtio-net-device,netdev=net0,mac=52:54:00:12:35:02 -device virtio-serial-device \
-drive id=disk0,file=lmp-console-image-qemuarm64-secureboot.wic,if=none,format=raw \
-device virtio-blk-device,drive=disk0 -netdev user,id=net0,hostfwd=tcp::2222-:22 \
-object rng-random,filename=/dev/urandom,id=rng0 -device virtio-rng-pci,rng=rng0 \
-chardev null,id=virtcon -machine virt,secure=on -nographic
During the boot sequence, you will observe the following:
[ 1.932467] Freeing unused kernel memory: 4736K
[ 1.933323] Run /init as init process
Starting version 250.5+
[ 53.995060] e2fsck: otaroot: clean, 7841/136880 files, 79834/156064 blocks
Enrolling LUKS2 keyslot based on pkcs11 token
Token successfully initialized
User PIN successfully initialized
Key pair generated:
Private Key Object; RSA
label: luks
ID: 9d
Usage: decrypt, sign
Access: sensitive, always sensitive, never extractable, local
Public Key Object; RSA 2048 bits
label: luks
ID: 9d
Usage: encrypt, verify
Access: local
Engine "pkcs11" set.
Created certificate:
7Certificate Object; type = X.509 cert
label: luks
subject: DN: CN=LmP
ID: 9d
Successfully logged into security token 'lmp' via protected authentication path.
New PKCS#11 token enrolled as key slot 0.
Wiped slot 31.
Successfully logged into security token 'lmp' via protected authentication path.
Successfully decrypted key with security token.
[...]
[ OK ] Reached target Basic System.
Starting D-Bus System Message Bus...
Starting Check and fix an … store of the docker daemon...
Starting IPv6 Packet Filtering Framework...
Starting IPv4 Packet Filtering Framework...
Starting Online LUKS2 disk re-encryption...
Starting User Login Management...
[ OK ] Started TEE Supplicant.
[ OK ] Started Network Name Resolution.
[ OK ] Finished IPv6 Packet Filtering Framework.
[ OK ] Finished IPv4 Packet Filtering Framework.
[ OK ] Starting Network Manager Script Dispatcher Service...
[ OK ] Started Network Manager Script Dispatcher Service.
Linux-microPlatform 4.0.11 qemuarm64-secureboot -
qemuarm64-secureboot login: fio
Password:
fio@qemuarm64-secureboot:~$
[ OK ] Finished Online LUKS2 disk re-encryption.
Starting Resize root filesystem to fit available disk space...
[ 210.434491] EXT4-fs (dm-0): resizing filesystem from 156064 to 160161 blocks
[ 210.448134] EXT4-fs (dm-0): resized filesystem to 160161
[ OK ] Finished Resize root filesystem to fit available disk space.
After the service has finished, you can inspect the volume. First list the block devices:
fio@qemuarm64-secureboot:~$ lsblk
NAME MAJ:MIN RM SIZE RO TYPE MOUNTPOINTS
zram0 251:0 0 0B 0 disk
vda 253:0 0 925.6M 0 disk
|-vda1 253:1 0 78M 0 part /var/rootdirs/mnt/boot
|-vda2 253:2 0 200M 0 part /boot
`-vda3 253:3 0 641.6M 0 part
`-vda3_crypt 252:0 0 625.6M 0 crypt /var
/usr
/
/sysroot
Then inspect the encrypted one:
fio@qemuarm64-secureboot:~$ sudo cryptsetup luksDump /dev/vda3
Password:
LUKS header information
Version: 2
Epoch: 99
Metadata area: 16384 [bytes]
Keyslots area: 16744448 [bytes]
UUID: 06be9f40-ac4f-4301-ad33-e566def6023d
Label: otaroot
Subsystem: (no subsystem)
Flags: (no flags)
Data segments:
0: crypt
offset: 16777216 [bytes]
length: (whole device)
cipher: aes-xts-plain64
sector: 512 [bytes]
Keyslots:
1: luks2
Key: 512 bits
Priority: normal
Cipher: aes-xts-plain64
Cipher key: 512 bits
PBKDF: pbkdf2
Hash: sha512
Iterations: 1000
Salt: a2 76 b4 61 3b c6 79 02 1a c1 23 89 02 ca 02 8f
f3 82 ec e6 c4 b0 6a c7 4a 4b 99 5e e6 92 c0 88
AF stripes: 4000
AF hash: sha512
Area offset:32768 [bytes]
Area length:258048 [bytes]
Digest ID: 1
Tokens:
0: systemd-pkcs11
pkcs11-uri: pkcs11:token=lmp;object=luks
pkcs11-key: 38 49 ce f7 3e e9 dc fc 66 3d b8 13 90 ec ec 29
99 73 5d 47 6a cb d0 fc 6c ab 1c a7 26 a8 08 7e
46 b3 5d 15 f5 01 a9 e7 e6 d2 80 72 15 14 0d 0b
61 85 fe ee 1f f8 f0 04 26 c8 46 31 83 52 cc 37
44 d7 2a 83 7d 5a d9 44 a3 90 d0 f5 ff f2 9d e3
6f 09 4b 2c 79 5e df e3 b0 f7 df b4 b2 8c 0b 78
0a 4a 31 c1 d1 63 bb 54 a3 ca c9 a9 a3 88 bc ec
96 68 25 26 75 b3 44 3d 9b ee bc a4 73 a5 e2 b3
f2 5e a3 74 29 32 7a 46 b2 af 55 cf 48 3d b6 ea
4e d0 ca 0c da 06 f1 4e 33 23 73 be bb b0 c0 e1
ab bf 7a 2d f3 d7 7a be 5c 01 e5 d6 ab 43 33 91
48 e7 14 77 61 1c b9 c0 2c 6a 47 36 4c 1f a1 81
39 8c 5b 56 43 fa 86 33 7f 8d ec ee cf 74 1a 3a
43 69 6d bf 3b 70 70 ea 4b f7 02 a0 99 c0 55 02
49 16 14 00 45 da 78 da b9 5e 34 17 65 1b 3b c3
78 26 64 60 bf fe da 11 a0 3b 7a f9 0f 9e 93 8f
Keyslot: 1
Digests:
1: pbkdf2
Hash: sha512
Iterations: 1000
Salt: a6 10 c3 0d 89 22 c4 67 32 c1 c4 49 31 6f 05 10
4a f6 3d bd 7f 26 7a ba 9e 74 54 0b 5f da 54 34
Digest: 58 da 0f b2 ec d5 0d 5d 3d 99 15 85 85 ab e5 40
41 14 9c 57 6a 16 02 08 5d 8f 2a 18 ca 77 2d 7b
e1 be 92 d4 0a 49 f1 f1 77 48 c3 c1 27 35 57 ea
68 47 60 20 15 a1 a2 80 11 c5 dd 8e c7 93 c4 80
You can also examine the PKCS#11 slot created by OP-TEE to verify the presence of the RSA-2048 key mentioned earlier:
root@qemuarm64-secureboot:/var/rootdirs/home/fio# pkcs11-tool --module /usr/lib/libckteec.so.0 --list-token-slots
Available slots:
Slot 0 (0x0): 94e9ab89-4c43-56ea-8b35-45dc07226830
token state: uninitialized
Slot 1 (0x1): 94e9ab89-4c43-56ea-8b35-45dc07226830
token label : lmp
token manufacturer : Linaro
token model : OP-TEE TA
token flags : login required, PIN pad present, rng, token initialized, PIN initialized
hardware version : 0.0
firmware version : 0.1
serial num : 0000000000000001
pin min/max : 4/128
Slot 2 (0x2): 94e9ab89-4c43-56ea-8b35-45dc07226830
token state: uninitialized
Note
The OP-TEE PKCS#11 secure storage emulation will NOT survive across reboots. As a consequence of this, because the root file system was encrypted, the system will encounter a failure in mounting the root file system during the subsequent boot.
If you were to reboot the system under the described circumstances, you should expect to encounter the following error:
[ 1.776260] registered taskstats version 1
[ 1.776628] Loading compiled-in X.509 certificates
[ 1.879079] Loaded X.509 cert 'Default insecure key from Factory II: 1b2327c0b75d0bc1e4914c8195bbf053629b8abb'
[ 1.902679] uart-pl011 9000000.pl011: no DMA platform data
[ 1.937637] Freeing unused kernel memory: 4736K
[ 1.938472] Run /init as init process
Starting version 250.5+
No slot with token named "lmp" found
PKCS11 certificate not found!